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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Not only are technological innovations proliferating by the day, current tech-
nology is also expanding in both capability and use. One technology in particular 
is being used in numerous new ways by a variety of groups: facial-recognition 
technology (FRT).1 Private companies are utilizing FRT in a number of ways 
that enhance the personalized nature of their products, but foreign governments 
have also been testing out uses of the technology.2 One of the ways governments 
have used FRT is to assist police in criminal identification.3 However, many crit-
ics warn that police use of FRT violates privacy rights and Congress should in-
troduce legislation to protect these rights.4 Some localities have gone as far as 
enacting laws prohibiting local government from using FRT on citizens.5 In the 
2019 case of Bridges v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police, a Welsh citizen sued 
the South Wales Police Department alleging a violation by the police department 
of his privacy rights under several laws, including the European Convention on 
Human Rights.6 The Court said “the case was the first of its kind worldwide.”7 
This Note is divided into two major sections. The first section provides infor-
mation on how FRT generally works, how FRT is being used differently by pri-
vate and public organizations, and how various countries and localities are either 
using FRT or reacting to the possible use of FRT. The second section explores 
the Bridges case in more detail, discussing the Plaintiff’s claims, analyzing the 
lower and appellate Welsh court’s reasoning, what the appellate court found, and 
assessing how the case would likely play out if appealed to the European Court 
of Human Rights. If appealed, the European Court of Human Rights will most 
likely affirm the initial Bridges ruling that Facial Recognition Surveillance does 
not violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Lastly, this 
 
 1 Steve Symanovich, How Does Facial Recognition Work?, NORTON SECURITY (Feb. 8, 
2019), https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-how-facial-recognition-software-works. 
html. 
 2 Ryan Browne, Tech Giants Want Rules on Facial Recognition, but Critics Warn that 
Won’t be Enough, CNBC (Aug. 30, 2019, 1:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/30/fa-
cial-recognition-tech-firms-want-regulation-but-critics-want-a-ban.html. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Shirin Ghaffary, San Francisco’s Facial Recognition Technology Ban, Explained, VOX 
(May 14, 2019, 7:06 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/14/18623897/san-francisco-
facial-recognition-ban-explained. 
 6 British Activist to Appeal ‘Sinister’ Police Facial Recognition, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2019, 
12:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-tech-privacy/british-activist-to-appeal-
sinister-police-facial-recognition-idUSKCN1VP2CI. 
 7 Id. 
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Note considers whether and how the Bridges decisions shape current interna-




FRT is being used by private and public entities increasingly each day. One of 
the most highly advertised features of the iPhone is its “Face ID” capability, 
which is an example of FRT being utilized by private entities.8 It is important to 
understand how facial recognition works. Put simply, the technology is “[a] fa-
cial recognition system [that] uses biometrics to map facial features from a pho-
tograph or video. It compares the information with a database of known faces to 
find a match.”9 While various FRT systems may operate differently, there are 
some basic steps. First, a photo or video registers a face and captures the face.10 
Next, the system will “read[] the geometry of” the face, including factors like 
“the distance between your eyes and the distance from forehead to chin.11 The 
software identifies facial landmarks—one system identifies 68 of them—that are 
key to distinguishing your face.”12 The result is known as the facial signature.13 
Third, the resulting facial signature “is compared to a database of known 
faces.”14 Lastly, a determination is made on whether the facial signature matches 
a face within the database.15 After providing a basic understanding of how the 
technology works, this Note now focuses on how personal facial biometric data 
can be used. 
Many people are aware of the use of FRT by mobile devices, but how else is 
this technology being used? Both private and government entities are using FRT 
in more ways than one could imagine. For example, the Ontario Lottery and 
Gaming Corporation uses FRT on some of its slot machines to identify problem 
gamblers.16 Additionally, some hotels use FRT so that concierges can greet cus-
tomers by name, there are dating apps that proclaim to match individuals with 
similar facial features, and some colleges use FRT to take attendance in class.17 
 
 8 About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE INC. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://support.ap-
ple.com/en-us/HT208108. 
 9 Symanovich, supra note 1. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Ysolt Usigan, 7 Surprising Ways Facial Recognition is Used, CBS NEWS (Aug. 5, 2011, 
1:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/7-surprising-ways-facial-recognition-is-used 
/2/. 
 17 Id. 
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Law enforcement also uses FRT to catch known identity thieves when they are 
applying for driver’s licenses.18 A more well-known use of FRT is on Facebook. 
When users upload pictures, Facebook scans faces in each picture and suggests 
“tagging” the people it believes those faces belong to.19 According to Facebook, 
the software accurately identifies a face ninety-eight percent of the time.20 As 
FRT usage across all industries becomes more prevalent, the market for this tech-
nology is simultaneously growing, expecting to jump from a $4 billion industry 
in 2017 up to $7.7 billion in 2022.21 
Like private entities, government entities are also utilizing FRT. In 2016, 
Georgetown Law conducted a study finding that “more than half of American 
adults were enrolled in a face recognition network searchable by law enforce-
ment.”22 Some organizations based in the United States are wary of FRT and fear 
that its use may infringe on constitutional rights because the technology “can be 
used in a passive way that doesn’t require the knowledge, consent, or participa-
tion of the subject.”23 One of the major concerns about FRT in the United States 
is that photographs of citizens from state motor vehicle agencies could be used 
in conjunction with public video surveillance to create a system that identifies 
and tracks citizens.24 
In fact, the United States Government Accountability Office reported that, 
“[s]ince 2011, the FBI had logged more than 390,000 facial-recognition searches 
of federal and local databases, including state [Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV)] databases . . . .”25 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents have 
also utilized DMV records for facial recognition purposes in states that allow 
undocumented immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses or permits.26 The FBI has 
responded to criticism of FRT usage, stating, “while facial-recognition searches 
can provide helpful leads, agents are expected to verify the findings and secure 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 Symanovich, supra note 1. 
 20 Naomi Lachange, Facebook’s Facial Recognition Software is Different from the FBI’s. 
Here’s Why, NPR (May 18, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsid-
ered/2016/05/18/477819617/facebooks-facial-recognition-software-is-different-from-the-
fbis-heres-why. 
 21 Symanovich, supra note 1. 
 22 The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. 
CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/publica-
tions/the-perpetual-line-up/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
 23 Face Recognition Technology, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technol-
ogy/surveillance-technologies/face-recognition-technology (last visited Mar. 29, 2021). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos are a Gold Mine for Fa-
cial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 3:54 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-
facial-recognition-searches/. 
 26 Id. 
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definitive proof before pursuing arrests or criminal charges.”27 Twenty-one states 
and the District of Columbia allow federal agencies to scan driver’s license pho-
tos, and the FBI has access to more than 641 million photos for facial-recognition 
searches.28 While concerns about FRT inaccurately identifying individuals lead-
ing to false arrests are significant, this Note focuses on a critical issue of FRT 
use: the right to privacy.29 
FRT is being utilized by various parties across the world, and public reaction 
to the technology differs. San Francisco was the first major city in the United 
States to ban local government from using the technology after catching wind of 
its critiques and possible violation of privacy.30 Other American cities, such as 
Oakland, California, and Somerville, Massachusetts, also proposed or passed 
legislation banning government use of FRT.31 
Germany’s Ministry of the Interior began a pilot program in 2017 using FRT 
in the Berlin Südkreuz railway station.32 In order to gain participants for the pro-
gram, “the ministry recruited around 300 volunteers who agreed, in exchange for 
a €25 Amazon voucher, to have their names and two biometric photos stored in 
a database and to carry a transponder around with them.”33 Requiring participants 
to carry a transponder allowed the authorities to track when participants travelled 
through the station.34 The second phase of the program tested whether cameras 
could identify suspicious behavior in real-time.35 However, many Germans were 
unpleased with these new security measures in place; critics of the pilot program 
worry the technology “is insufficiently transparent and exposes citizens to inva-
sions of privacy, especially if their data is kept on file.”36 Germans, after experi-
encing “two surveillance states” during the Nazi and East German communist 
regimes, are especially wary about invasions of personal privacy.37 
China is using FRT in a multitude of ways, from law enforcement to social 
uses. Cameras on lamp posts, outside buildings, and on streets are able to 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License Data-
bases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-driv-
ers-licenses-facial-recognition.html. 
 30 Ghaffary, supra note 5. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Janosch Delcker, Big Brother in Berlin, POLITICO (Sept. 13, 2018, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-big-brother-state-surveillance-facial-recognition-tech-
nology/. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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recognize Chinese citizens.38 Moreover, some public housing projects use FRT 
to prevent illegal subletting, allowing only residents and delivery persons to en-
ter.39 Chinese law enforcement “use[s] facial recognition to pluck persons of in-
terest from concert crowds, and have even used wearable Google Glass-style de-
vices that allow a cop to scan the face of anyone they’re looking at.”40 Chinese 
citizens found a way to possibly avoid FRT usage.41 As noted in media coverage, 
“[m]any protesters now cover their faces, and they fear that the police are using 
cameras and possibly other tools to single out targets for arrest.”42 
In Wales, the South Wales Police began a pilot program using FRT, allowing 
officers to monitor the movement of people in specific locations.43 The Police 
explained that camera positions would be used to identify people who were on a 
pre-determined watch list. The makeup of each watch list could include wanted 
persons or persons suspected of criminality, missing persons, and persons of in-
terest.44 The Police also said FRT could be used for both public safety and na-
tional security purposes, including for uses such as identifying individuals during 
a disturbance, or maintaining the security of high-traffic places.45 
The South Wales Police call the program “AFR Locate,” for automated facial 
recognition technology.46 It can be used in “live-time” and compares live images 
from cameras placed around the city against a predetermined watchlist of persons 
of interest.47 The program was used around fifty times between May 2017 and 
April 2019.48 The South Wales Police created a website that provides the basis 
of the technology, upcoming events where they are utilizing the program, past 
events where they used the program, and frequently asked questions and 
 
 38 Arjun Kharpal, China’s Surveillance Tech is Spreading Globally, Raising Concerns 
About Beijing’s Influence, CNBC (Oct. 8, 2019, 1:18 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/china-is-exporting-surveillance-tech-like-facial-recogniti 
on-globally.html. 
 39 Tom Simonite, Behind the Rise of China’s Facial-Recognition Giants, WIRED (Sept. 
03, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/behind-rise-chinas-facial-recognition-gi-
ants/. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Paul Mozur, In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recogni-
tion-surveillance.html. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Introduction of Facial Recognition into South Wales Police, S. WALES POLICE, 
https://afr.south-wales.police.uk/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7E5AE0CF 
3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc 
.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
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answers.49 The website reassures citizens “[f]aces that are not matched against 
the watchlist are not remembered or kept,” and “[p]eople not featured in a watch-
list can’t be identified.”50 
While the South Wales Police support the use of FRT, not all Welsh citizens 
feel similarly.51 In 2019, Ed Bridges brought the first major legal challenge 
against the use of FRT by the South Wales Police.52 Bridges believes his face 
was scanned by the Wales Police twice—once during busy holiday shopping and 
once during a peaceful protest.53 Bridges stated that the van equipped with FRT 
“was parked directly opposite” of a “peaceful demonstration—seemingly aimed 
at discouraging us from lawfully exercising our right to protest.”54 At the core of 
Bridges’ argument is his belief that the use of FRT by the police violates citizens’ 
privacy. Bridges is also concerned about FRT’s behavioral effect on privacy, 
such as people feeling scared to protest.55 Along with his privacy infringement 
claim, Bridges argues the technology the police are using is highly flawed, with 
ninety-one percent of their ‘matches’ being misidentifications, totaling 2,451 
people wrongly identified.56 Based on these concerns, Bridges sued the Chief 
Constable of South Wales Police in Bridges v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Po-
lice, claiming a violation of his privacy rights under the Welsh Equality Act of 
2010, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Data Protection Acts 
of 1998 and 2018.57 On September 4, 2019, the High Court in Wales dismissed 
the case.58 Afterwards, Bridges publicly stated that he would appeal the deci-
sion.59 The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal and it ruled in Bridges’s 
favor on August 11, 2020, finding that the use FRT by the police violated Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.60 The remainder of this Note 
 
 49 Introduction of Facial Recognition into South Wales Police, supra note 43. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Police Facial Recognition Technology Rules ‘Need Tightening,’ BBC NEWS (May 23, 
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-48383920. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Ed Bridges, End Lawless and Dangerous Police use of Facial Recognition Technology, 
CROWDJUSTICE, https://www.crowdjustice.com/case/facial-recognition/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2021). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *5 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7 
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
 58 Id. 
 59 British Activist to Appeal ‘Sinister’ Police Facial Recognition, supra note 6. 
 60 Lara White & Janine Regan, Key Takeaways for the Private Sector from The Bridges v 
South Wales Police Facial Recognition Case, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Aug. 27, 2020), 
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2020/08/key-takeaways-for-the-private-sector-from-
the-bridges-v-south-wales-police-facial-recognition-case/. 
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discusses the Courts’ reasoning in Bridges, and whether, if appealed all the way 
to the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights 
would find a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, and lastly, 




Wales is a part of the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom is a member 
of the Council of Europe.61 The forty-seven states that are members of the Coun-
cil of Europe are all parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.62 The 
idea for the European Convention on Human Rights arose during the Second 
World War in the 1940s.63 The convention was adopted in 1950 and entered into 
force in 1953.64 Agreement to the convention is a prerequisite for joining the 
Council of Europe.65 If an individual feels that their rights under the convention 
have been violated, they may bring a complaint to the Strasbourg Court when 
they have exhausted all their appeal opportunities in their member state’s 
courts.66 
There are fifty-nine Articles in the heart of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights.67 Bridges claimed his rights were violated under Article 8 of the 
Convention.68 Article 8, the “[r]ight to respect for private and family life,” states 
the following: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
 
 61 Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-
member-states (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). 
 62 What is the European Convention on Human Rights?, AMNESTY INT’L UK (Aug. 21, 
2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/what-is-the-european-convention-on-human-
rights. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 The European Convention on Human Rights: A Convention to Protect your Rights and 
Liberties, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention/home 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2021). 
 66 Id. 
 67 European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.echr.coe.int/Doc-
uments/Convention_ENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). 
 68 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *10 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7 
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
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There shall be no interference by a public authority with the ex-
ercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of na-
tional security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others.69 
Moreover, Bridges brought claims under the Data Protection Acts (DPA) of 
1998 and 2018 and the Public-Sector Equality Duty Claim; however, this Note 
does not discuss Bridges’ claims under these laws in detail because they do not 
have the same international significance as the convention. The Bridges case has 
been heard by a lower-level court, the High Court of Wales, and an appellate 
court, the Court of Appeal. Both decisions will be briefly discussed here. 
In the first decision of the Bridges case, the High Court of Wales looked at 
Bridges’ claim that the South Wales Police’s use of AFR Locate violated Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.70 The court acknowledged that 
the use of FRT was “technology of the sort that must give pause for thought 
because of its potential to impact upon privacy rights.”71 The court further rec-
ognized the warranted concern of FRT usage, quoting “the Grand Chamber of 
the Strasbourg Court” in S v. United Kingdom: 
[T]he protection afforded by art.8 of the Convention would be 
unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques 
in the criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and with-
out carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use 
of such techniques against important private-life interests . . . any 
state claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technol-
ogies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in 
this regard.72 
In determining whether the police violated Article 8 of the Convention, the 
court first looked at the “reach” of Article 8.73 The opinion acknowledged that 
while Article 8 has its limits, it is still a broad law.74 The words “private life” 
 
 69 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67. 
 70 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *10 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4 
A7E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&co
ntextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. (quoting S v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 32). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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comprise many spheres of life and can “embrace multiple aspects of a person’s 
‘physical and social identity,’ including . . . gender, name, other means of per-
sonal identification and of linking to a family, ethnic identity, and elements re-
lating to a person’s right to their image.”75 
To find for Bridges, the court would have had to conclude his rights were 
violated under Article 8, and then determine the use of FRT by the police was 
not in accordance with the law or unnecessary for the listed reasons in Article 
8(2).76 In determining whether the technology infringed upon Bridges’ privacy, 
the court noted that in another case “where state actions complained of were ‘ex-
pected and unsurprising,’ it might well be that such actions might entail no 
breach of Article 8(1)” and stated that merely taking pictures of citizens in public 
spaces, without aggravating circumstances, was not an infringement of Article 8 
rights.77 However, the court deemed that AFR Locate could not be characterized 
the same way as merely taking a photograph could be.78 The court reasoned the 
two instances were much different because in AFR Locate, “[t]he digital infor-
mation that comprises the image is analysed and the biometric facial data is ex-
tracted. That information is then further processed when it is compared to the 
watchlists information. The fact that this happens when the Claimant is in a pub-
lic space is not a sufficient response.”79 Further, the court noted that “[t]he ex-
traction and use of the Claimant’s biometric data takes the present case well be-
yond the ‘expected and unsurprising.’”80 Once again, the decision quoted the 
European Court of Human Rights, which previously stated, “[t]he mere storing 
of data relating to private life of an individual amounts to an interference within 
the meaning of art.8.’”81 Much like fingerprints or DNA, AFR Locate provides 
“the extraction of unique information and identifiers” which can lead to identifi-
cation of an individual.82 The court determined the time period of the retention 
of the facial data did not matter; rather, that the collection of data is sufficient 
under Article 8 if the data is captured, stored, and processed.83 For reasons 
 
 75 Id. (citation omitted). 
 76 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67. 
 77 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *12 (Eng.) (quoting R . (On the Application of Wood) v. 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 WLR 123), 
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/Ful 
lText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
 78 Id. at *17. 
 79 Id. at *12. 
 80 Id. at *13. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at *18. 
 83 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *14 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7 
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
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discussed above, as well as a few other minor factors discussed by the court, the 
court ruled that the use of AFR Locate did infringe upon Bridges’ rights under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.84 
The next question in resolving Bridges’ claims under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights was the more complex piece of the analysis: 
Whether the South Wales Police’s use of AFR Locate was in accordance with 
the law.85 Bridges presented several contentions that the Police’s use of FRT was 
not in accordance with the law.86 For example, Bridges pointed to legislation that 
regulated the Police’s collection and use of fingerprints and DNA, and noted that 
there was no similar, or adequate, legal framework for facial recognition tech-
nology at the time.87 Considering that understanding of the police’s common law 
powers, and looking at some applications of that power, the court found that the 
police did not need express statutory powers in order to use AFR Locate.88 
Bridges’s second contention was that there was no sufficient legal framework 
for AFR Locate.89 The court noted that a previous decision found that the neces-
sary qualities of a legal framework were foreseeability, predictability, and legal-
ity.90 In Wales, there are different legal frameworks for obtaining other types of 
biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA.91 The court acknowledged that dif-
ferent types of biometric information should be evaluated individually when de-
termining the appropriate legal framework for each.92 
The court found there was a “clear and sufficient legal framework” to deter-
mine when and how AFR Locate could be used by the police.93 It reasoned that 
just because the technology was new, the technology was not “outside the scope 
of existing regulation, or that it is always necessary to create a bespoke legal 
framework for it.”94 The court asserted that the use of FRT was already regulated 
in three ways: primary legislation, secondary legislative instruments, like codes, 
and the local police’s own policies.95 In light of these regulations and common 
 
 84 Id. at *14. 
 85 Id. at *15. 
 86 Id. at *15–16. 
 87 Id. at *20–21. 
 88 Id. at *18. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (citing R (Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307 at 
[34]). 
 91 R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC 
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *19 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7 
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at *20. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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law, the court found that the use of AFR Locate was “sufficiently foreseeable 
and accessible for the purpose of the ‘in accordance with the law’ standard.”96 
The court then considered whether the use of AFR Locate passed a four-part 
test that was established in a previous case.97 An interference with Article 8(1) 
rights is justified if the interference passes the test set forth in Bank Mellat v. Her 
Majesty’s Treasury.98 The four factors in the test are: 
1. whether the objective of the measure pursued is sufficiently 
important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right; 
2. whether it is rationally connected to the objective; 
3. whether a less intrusive measure could have been used with-
out unacceptably compromising the objective; and 
4. whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of 
the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the 
rights of the individual and the interests of the community.99 
The court deemed that the first two factors were satisfied without much dis-
cussion, finding the police force “uses AFR Locate for a legitimate aim, that the 
legitimate aim is sufficiently important to justify interfering with the Claimant’s 
rights under Article 8” and that the police’s “use of AFR Locate is rationally 
connected to the legitimate aim.”100 Thus, the Court turned to the second two 
factors to determine fully whether a less intrusive measure could have been used 
to accomplish the same objective and whether a fair balance was struck.101 
As noted above, the court did not find for Bridges on any of his claims, and 
the court therefore dismissed the case on all claims.102 The court was “satisfied 
both that the current legal regime is adequate to ensure the appropriate and non-
arbitrary use of AFR Locate, and that police force’s use to date of AFR Locate 
has been consistent with the requirements of the Human Rights Act, and the data 
protection legislation.”103 
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Based on the “sensitive processing of personal data of members of the public” 
present in the case before them, the court decided to apply a “close standard of 
scrutiny” when analyzing the third and fourth factors.104 On the factor of propor-
tionality, Bridges made five claims as to why the use was not proportionate.105 
The court did not find any of Bridges’s contentions on the third factor to be con-
vincing.106 
Regarding the fourth factor of the Bank Mellat test, a fair balance between 
rights of individuals with community interests, the court ruled—even under a 
higher level of scrutiny—that the use of AFR Locate was not disproportionate to 
their aim.107 The decision was based on the following reasons: 
AFR Locate was deployed in an open and transparent way, with 
significant public engagement. On each occasion, it was used for 
a limited time, and covered a limited footprint. It was deployed 
for the specific and limited purpose of seeking to identify partic-
ular individuals (not including the Claimant) who may have been 
in the area and whose presence was of justifiable interest to the 
police. On the former occasion it led to two arrests. On the latter 
occasion it identified a person who had made a bomb threat at the 
very same event the previous year and who had been subject to a 
(suspended) custodial sentence. On neither occasion did it lead to 
a disproportionate interference with anybody’s Article 8 rights. 
Nobody was wrongly arrested. Nobody complained as to their 
treatment (save for the Claimant on a point of principle). Any in-
terference with the Claimant’s Article 8 rights would have been 
very limited. The interference would be limited to the near instan-
taneous algorithmic processing and discarding of the Claimant’s 
biometric data. No personal information relating to the Claimant 
would have been available to any police officer, or to any human 
agent. No data would be retained. There was no attempt to iden-
tify the Claimant. He was not spoken to by any police officer.108 
Thus, all four factors of the Bank Mellat test were met, meaning that infringing 
on Article 8(1) rights is permissible. 
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Bridges appealed his case to the Court of Appeal and on August 11, 2020, the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales overturned the dismissal of the case, find-
ing that the use of AFR was unlawful and violated human rights.109 Bridges ap-
pealed the dismissal from the High Court on the following five grounds: 
1. The High Court had erred in its conclusion that South Wales 
Police’s use of AFR and interference with Mr. Bridges’ rights 
was in accordance with the law under Article 8(2) of the ECHR. 
2. The High Court had incorrectly concluded that the use of AFR 
and interference with Mr. Bridges’ rights was proportionate un-
der Article 8(2) of the ECHR. 
3. The High Court was wrong to consider the DPIA carried out in 
relation to the processing sufficient for the purposes of Section 
64 of the DPA 2018. 
4. The High Court should not have declined to reach a conclusion 
as to whether South Wales Police had an “appropriate policy doc-
ument” in place regarding the use of AFR Locate that was within 
the meaning of Section 42 of the DPA 2018 for carrying out sen-
sitive data processing. 
5. The High Court was wrong to hold that South Wales Police 
had complied with the Public Sector Equality Duty (“PSED”) un-
der Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, on the grounds that the 
Equality Impact Assessment carried out was ‘obviously inade-
quate’ and failed to recognize the risk of indirect discrimination 
on the basis of sex or race.110 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal granted the appeal on the basis of the conten-
tions in 1, 3, and 5, but rejected the contentions in 2 and 4.111 While the Court of 
Appeal ruled differently than the High Court, they did not admonish the lower 
court for its decision, but rather acknowledged its “admirably clear and compre-
hensive judgments,” and that it would be “impossible in following brief summary 
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to do justice to the judgment.”112 The reasoning of the Court of Appeal will now 
be briefly discussed. 
On ground 1, the Court of Appeal did not “accept the submission on behalf of 
SWP that the present context is analogous to the taking of photographs or the use 
of CCTV cameras. The following features of the present case lead us to conclude 
that it falls somewhere in between the two poles on a spectrum . . . .”113 The court 
noted that AFR was not analogous to previous technology use by the police for 
several reasons.114 The reasons were that AFR is a novel technology, it involved 
the capturing of images of a large member of the public, most of which would 
be no interest to the police, this data constituted “sensitive” personal data within 
the DPA 2018, and that the data was processed in an automated manner.115 
Within the legal framework, the court found “fundamental deficiencies” in two 
areas for the use of AFR. The fundamental deficiencies were the “who question” 
and the “where question,” finding that “[i]n relation to both of those questions 
too much discretion is currently left to individual police officers. It is not clear 
who can be placed on the watchlist nor is it clear that there are any criteria for 
determining where AFR can be deployed.”116 Ultimately, the Court stated, “that 
the current policies do not sufficiently set out the terms on which discretionary 
powers can be exercised by the police and for that reason do not have the neces-
sary quality of law.”117 
On ground 2, the issue of proportionality of the use of AFR to harm the police 
were trying to mitigate, the Court noted that it was technically unnecessary for 
them to consider the issue because once it was determined that “the interference 
with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights was not in accordance with the law,” that 
one does not need to proceed to the next stage where it is determined if the inter-
ference was proportionate.118 
Grounds 3 and 4 of Bridges’s appeal related to section 64 of the DPA 2018 so 
it will not be discussed due to its lack of relevancy to the European Convention 
on Human Rights. While Ground 5 dealt with the Public Sector Equality Duty, 
so there will be no discussion of this section for the same reason. 
The Court granted the appeal on Grounds 1, 3, and 5, and found declaratory 
relief to be the correct remedy.119 The declaration of the Court is as follows: 
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1. The Respondent’s use of Live Automated Facial Recognition 
technology on 21 December 2017 and 27 March 2018 and on an 
ongoing basis, which engaged Article 8(1) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, was not in accordance with the law for 
the purposes of Article 8(2). 
2. As a consequence of the declaration set out in paragraph 1 
above, in respect of the Respondent’s ongoing use of Live Auto-
mated Facial Recognition technology, its Data Protection Impact 
Assessment did not comply with section 64(3)(b) and (c) of the 
Data Protection Act of 2018. 
3. The respondent did not comply with the Public Sector Equality 
Duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 prior to or in the 
course of its use of Live Automated Facial Recognition technol-
ogy on 21 December 2017 and 27 March 2018 and on an ongoing 
basis.120 
If Bridges’s case had been denied an appeal, his case had been dismissed, or 
is appealed and loses on the merits before the Supreme Court of the United King-
dom, then Bridges could appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.121 After 
the final decision from the Welsh courts, Bridges must submit an application to 
the European Court of Human Rights within six months.122 The application to 
must relate to one of the rights within the European Convention on Human 
Rights.123 Therefore, Bridges could appeal his challenge on the grounds that the 
use of AFR Locate violated his Article 8 rights, but not on his claims under 
Welsh law. 
Once the European Court of Human Rights receives an application, it deter-
mines the admissibility of the application. To be admissible, the application 
“must comply with certain requirements set out in the Convention.”124 If the 
court finds the application inadmissible, then the decision is final and cannot be 
overturned.125 If the court finds the application admissible, then the court encour-
ages the parties to reach a settlement.126 However, if the parties refuse to settle, 
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then the court will hear the case and decide whether a violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights transpired.127 
The current backlog of cases in the court means it could take up to a year 
before the court hears a case.128 Almost all European Court of Human Rights 
proceedings take place in writing, and parties are informed of the final decision 
in writing.129 If the court finds a violation under the Convention, it awards “a 
sum of money in compensation for certain forms of damage.”130 The court cannot 
“overrule national decisions or annul national laws.”131 So, in the event that 
Bridges appeals his case and wins at the European Court of Human Rights, he 
would gain financial compensation; however, he would not receive any guaran-
tee the Welsh government will stop using the technology. 
The European Court of Human Rights has evaluated hundreds, if not thou-
sands, of claims under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.132 The court published a guide for Article 8 claims in 2016, citing more 
than 700 cases.133 While the court has yet to consider a case on facial recognition 
technology of this sort, it has issued opinions involving personal images, video 
surveillance, and personal data privacy.134 Several cases the Court has disposed 
of contain claims with similar elements to those in Bridges, which demonstrates 
how the court may frame and ultimately rule on this issue. 
In several cases, the court held “that the recording of a video in the law en-
forcement context or the release of the applicants’ photographs by police author-
ities to the media constituted an interference with their right to respect for private 
life.”135 However, the court has also found “the taking and retention of a photo-
graph of a suspected terrorist without her consent was not disproportionate to the 
legitimate terrorist-prevention aims of a democratic society.”136 Bridges’s claim 
of privacy violation seems to arise in a situation much more similar to the latter 
case, as Bridges’s photo was not distributed to anyone nor was he identified 
based on that video surveillance as a criminal by the police department or the 
media. 
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In another case, the court held that rights under Article 8 would be “unaccept-
ably weakened” if modern scientific techniques used by the criminal justice sys-
tem “were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential ben-
efits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life 
interests.”137 While that holding came out of S. and Marper v. the United King-
dom, which involved fingerprint and DNA data,138 the court could easily apply 
such principles to Bridges, as his claim derives from utilizing new technology in 
the criminal justice system and involves personal data. Nevertheless, as dis-
cussed above, the High Court of Wales went into a rather thorough balancing 
analysis between citizens’ Article 8 rights and the government’s interests.139 
Thus, the High Court of Wales will likely carefully balance such interests, as the 
European Court of Human Rights calls for, given a similar situation. 
Peck v. the United Kingdom is another useful case in framing Bridges’ Article 
8 claim.140 In this case, video surveillance identifying a man attempting suicide 
in a public place was distributed to media for broadcast.141 Despite the fact that 
the surveillance of this man was in a public place, the Court held that the gov-
ernment’s actions here violated his privacy rights.142 While this case has some 
similarities to Bridges in that both involved video surveillance of citizens in a 
public place, the major distinction between the two is the dissemination of that 
footage to the media in Peck. Thus, based on the major factual difference in dis-
semination, the Court may see the government’s actions regarding Bridges as 




As technological advances proliferate, the legal framework surrounding and 
governing the use of technology is also expanding. As personal information be-
comes increasingly accessible, a pertinent question emerges: Where will the le-
gal community draw the line concerning privacy rights? Facial Recognition 
Technology is rapidly developing, as well as its application by government ser-
vices on their citizens. Countries and cities around the world are starting to wres-
tle with the tension between public safety and personal privacy regarding law 
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enforcement agencies employing FRT as a tool to monitor citizens in public 
spaces. 
Bridges highlights this delicate balancing act that courts and legislatures will 
face when considering this topic. Bridges believed his face had been scanned by 
Welsh police during peaceful protests and challenged the usage of FRT by claim-
ing that it violated his privacy rights.  The High Court of Wales and the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales provided detailed analyses of all of Bridges’ 
claims, including his Article 8 claim. Comparing the factual events in Bridges to 
other Article 8 claims the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on, it ap-
pears that as the Welsh program currently stands, the Court would probably not 
find a violation of Bridges’ Article 8 rights. Based on the lack of public distribu-
tion, storage, and limited target lists, the Welsh AFR Locate program does not 
seem invasive enough to constitute a violation of Bridges’ Article 8 rights. At 
this time, if Bridges were to exhaust all his remedies at the national level, it is 
unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights would hold the use of AFR 
Locate violated his Article 8 rights. 
While FRT used in the manner the South Wales Police Department used it in 
AFR Locate does not appear to violate Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, other governments’ use of FRT very well may be more invasive 
and violate other international laws or norms. As governments continue to utilize 
facial recognition technology in various ways, it is highly likely that many new 
legal questions will present themselves. 
 
